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Abstract 
This thesis studies the relationship between gender diversity, corporate governance and firm 
performance. We study Swedish publically listed firms on the Stockholm stock exchange. 
After controlling for firm and board characteristics, we find that gender diversity has a 
negative effect on CEO turnover and no significant effect on firm market valuation, but a 
positive significant effect on firm performance. Overall, we contribute to a large body of 
literature examining the role of gender in corporate boards. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, gender equality in corporate boards is not a question of ‘if’, but ‘when’. Many 
firms and organisations are very adamant in their belief that gender inequality is a problem, in 
society in general and in the boardrooms specifically. The chairman of The Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board states that at least 40% of the boardroom must consist of the 
least represented sex by 2020 (SvD 2014).  
 
The Swedish Corporate Governance Board, which is responsible for drafting the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Code, urges Swedish companies to strive for gender balance on their 
board (The Swedish Corporate Governance Board 2014). Seemingly, the purpose of the code 
is to address the lack of gender equality. An interesting question that arises is whether or not 
gender equality affects other factors than the justice aspect itself.  
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) contend that a more equal composition of men and women in 
corporate boards changes the outcome of their activity. They find that the presence of female 
directors can have both a positive and negative effect on firm financial performance, 
depending on the nature of the firm studied. Thus, the effect of gender diversity could be 
another motivational factor to take into consideration. An additional paper from an 
organization expanding opportunities for women and business, finds a positive relationship 
between firm performance and diversity (Catalyst 2004). These papers are two of many 
suggesting that gender equality does not only affect the names in the board rooms, but other 
factors such as monitoring and firm performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Farrell and 
Hersch 2005). 
!
This paper shows that female directors in Swedish boards actually influence the firms in 
different aspects. Studying roughly 238 Swedish publically listed firms over the course of 6 
years, our main results indicate that a CEO turnover is less likely to take place in boards with 
a higher fraction of female directors. Additionally, we find a positive significant relationship 
of a gender diverse board on firm performance. Generally, our paper contributes to similar 
literature who also suggests there is a link between gender and board behavior.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized in following manner. In the next section we 
summarize related literature and in section 3 we define the hypotheses. Section 4 describes 
the sample and data used in our regressions while section 5 provides a description of the 
methodology and a general model. In section 6 the results of our regressions are presented. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. We provide additional statistics in the appendix. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Gender differences and monitoring 
A large body of economic literature examines the general differences between men and 
women. Using economic experiments, Croson and Gneezy (2009) find robust differences in 
risk, social and competitive preferences between men and women. They acknowledge that, on 
average, women are more risk-averse and averse to competition than men. However, the 
authors argue that these differences disappear when people move through the corporate ranks, 
since people in managerial positions tend to be more risk taking and choose to put focus on 
their careers.  
 
In a study more related to ours, Adams and Funk (2012) study gender differences using a 
sample of directors in Swedish publically traded firms. They hypothesize that, in order for 
women to get appointed to influential corporate positions, they could be forced to behave 
more like men. However, they find fundamental gender differences in director values. Their 
study shows that female directors are more charitable and less interested in power than male 
directors. Contrary to traditional belief and the general findings in the study by Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) they also find female directors to be less risk-averse than their male 
colleagues. Adams and Funk (2012) use their results to argue that changing the gender 
balance in the boardroom can also change the behavior of the board and have a causal 
relationship with decision-making in the firm. They also underline that companies should not 
focus on the traditional image of women in the population when considering appointing 
women to top corporate positions, since there are significant differences in spirit between 
female directors and the general female population (Adams and Funk 2012).  
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) use gender differences between men and women as one of the 
cornerstones in their study. Starting with the current debate about female quotas on boards, 
they argue that these discussions are based on the view that having women on the board 
would affect the governance of the company. One effect could be that gender diverse boards 
would be more effective since there is a bigger supply of qualified directors to choose from 
when including women. Using a sample of US firms, they find that board monitoring is 
impacted by the presence of females in the board. They also show that women attend more 
board meetings and are more likely to be involved in monitoring committees than their male 
colleagues. These results are suggested to show that gender diverse boards put more effort 
into monitoring. The authors argue that if women attend more meetings, and are more 
involved in monitoring, women should affect the boards’ overall position in monitoring 
matters.  
 
To further study the monitoring principles in companies with gender diverse boards, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) look at CEO turnover as a measure of the boards monitoring. They find 
that boards that are more gender diverse are more likely to fire a CEO for bad stock results 
and suggest that company boards with more women are tougher in monitoring than boards 
with a larger percentage of males. 
 
The matter of monitoring managers and the CEO is one of the most important tasks of the 
board of directors in a firm. When monitoring the leadership, boards should look out for 
misbehaving managers. To keep track of the management, a board can use for example 
accounting measures and auditing to see misuse of company funds or bad decision-making 
(Adams et al. 2010). 
 
 
Gul et al. (2008) study the impact of female board members on monitoring examining the 
differences in auditing fees in a sample of US firms from 2001 to 2003. In their study they 
hypothesize that boards containing female directors are more likely to have a higher level of 
monitoring. If this hypothesis was to be true, it would lead them to believe that firms with 
gender diverse boards would put more effort into auditing, and therefore demand higher audit 
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fees. They find evidence supporting that boards with a higher fraction of female directors is 
connected to the firm spending more money on auditing, in comparison to firms with lower 
gender diversity in their top governance.  
 
Using agency theory as their starting point, Simpson et al. (2010) study a sample of S&P 1500 
companies and discuss the effect of women on monitoring. Consistent with the results of 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al., the authors also show that women have a higher 
percentage representation in audit, corporate governance and nomination committee 
appointments than males. They also find that women executives are less likely to have a 
business background compared to men, and are more likely to have an academic or consulting 
background. Since women board members are more independent than male counterparts, the 
authors discuss that gender diverse boards should do a better job of monitoring managers. 
They argue that due to their minority status in the board room, they could feel less connected 
to the management, also implying a tougher monitoring. 
 
2.2. Gender diversity and firm performance 
To understand the potential relationship between gender diversity and firm performance, the 
subject frequently studied, often with mixed results (Adams et al. 2015). Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), who study a sample consisting of S&P 500, MidCap and SmallCap firms, use their 
findings on monitoring as a starting point to understand the potential relationship between 
gender diversity in board rooms and firm performance. They argue that more female director 
involvement could mean both positive and negative results for firm performance. A positive 
effect could be the smaller likelihood of agency problems with stricter monitoring, an 
important aspect of having a strong board of directors. 
 
In their paper about corporate boards, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that director 
involvement in decisions could result in communication problems between management and 
directors. The authors also argue that because board members with diverse backgrounds can 
have different opinions, the possibility of disagreement and conflict could arise, making the 
decision making less effective and also resulting in negative effects for financial measures. 
Since they found that women attend more board meetings, Adams and Ferreira (2009) discuss 
that the higher attendance inevitably would lead to more involvement by female board 
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members in the daily operations. More involvement would increase the risk of interference 
between management and directors, and could therefore result in a negative effect of gender 
diverse boards on firm performance. 
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a significant negative effect of the fraction of females on the 
board and Tobin’s q, as well as Return on Assets (ROA). They find that the fraction of female 
directors has a negative effect on firm performance in firms that are strong in governance. In 
companies with previously weak governance, the gender diverse board adds financial value, 
and the argument is made that gender diverse boards can cause “over-monitoring” in firms 
with otherwise strong governance. This result can be linked to the study of S&P 1500 
companies by Faleye et al. (2011) who show that an improvement in monitoring can be 
costly. Putting more effort into monitoring, causes the firm to have less innovation, worse 
reactions to acquisitions and weaker strategic governance.  
 
There are a few Scandinavian studies related to our own. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) use a 
sample of Norwegian companies between 1989 and 2002. In their study, they find a negative 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. They argue that the reason for 
the negative effect is that heterogeneous boards are less effective in their decision making. 
Related to this, two other studies of the Scandinavian countries have found that gender 
diversity does not have a significant relationship with firm performance. Rose (2007) uses a 
sample of listed firms in Denmark, and argues that his results could be due to that female 
directors could have adopted into the characteristics of the majority of male directors. Randoy 
et al. (2006) study the 500 largest companies in Sweden, Denmark and Norway and also find 
no significant effects. The authors conclude that their results mean that increasing diversity 
can be done without decreasing shareholder value, but also that diversity should not be seen 
as a fast solution for increasing firm performance.  
 
Liu et al. (2014) study a sample of Chinese publically traded companies and find a positive 
impact of female board directors on firm performance. The authors explain these results by an 
improvement in company reputation, as well as decision making. In their study, they separate 
female executive directors from female independent directors, finding two separate effects 
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and concluding that the positive overall effect originates from the executive directors’ 
leadership and decision-making, not from the monitoring effect of independent directors. 
Huang and Kisgen (2013), who study data of US firms, also find that a large number of 
female executives could help create shareholder value. They find that women make different 
corporate decisions than men, where females are not as likely to make an acquisition or issue 
debt as males. The authors argue that these results are due to male overconfidence. With these 
findings in mind, the researchers discuss that the gender composition of top leadership should 
be considered (Huang and Kisgen 2013).  
 
Catalyst, an organization working to strengthen women’s opportunities in business, study a 
sample of US Fortune 500 companies for the period 1996 to 2000. They suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between financial firm performance and gender diversity. It is argued 
that to have high representation of women in top management is linked with better financial 
performance. The report shows that on average, firms that had the best financial performance 
also had more women on the top management. In total, the results demonstrated that corporate 
performance is linked with gender diversity and vice versa (Catalyst 2004). 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
With the literature on both gender and monitoring and firm performance in mind, we can 
summarize our own hypothesis. After the gender representation quota in Norway being noted 
by other countries, the debate about gender equality in Swedish boardrooms is present in the 
media landscape (SvD 2014). The current discussions could be a case for obtaining further 
knowledge on the subject and therefore testing if gender diversity affects board and firm 
outcomes. 
 
Since there are differing preferences between men and women, in regards to risk preferences 
(Croson and Gneezy 2009; Adams and Funk 2012) this could suggest that a gender diverse 
board behaves differently from a homogenous one.  As previous studies have shown, more 
gender-diverse boards can be correlated with higher levels of monitoring (Adams and Ferreira 
2009; Gul et al 2008). Therefore, we expect that a gender diverse board is more sensitive to 
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stock performance in CEO-turnover, due to tougher monitoring of the CEO. Similar to Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) we measure monitoring of the CEO using CEO turnover.  
 
Our hypothesis of the effect of gender diversity on monitoring is:  
H1: A gender diverse board is more likely to replace the CEO after a period of bad stock 
performance.  
 
A number of differing results have been found when researching the effects of gender diverse 
boards and their effect of financial performance. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) argue that their 
negative results are caused by diverse boards being less effective in their decision-making.  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find negative effects in companies with strong governance, and 
discuss that this could be due to over-monitoring in the firm. The authors pose that boards that 
are tougher monitors can interfere and provide problems in communications between 
management and the board.  Faleye et al. (2011) also show how a high effort of monitoring 
can cause negative effects for a company. In a ranking of countries by their overall corporate 
governance done by executive search firm Heidrick & Struggles (2009), Sweden ranked as 
the third best country, which would suggest that Swedish firms are on average strong in 
governance, and the tougher monitoring of a gender diverse board would therefore imply a 
negative effect on firm performance. 
 
Like Adams and Ferreira (2009), we measure firm performance using ROA and firm market 
valuation using Tobin’s q.  
 
We state our hypotheses of the effects on firm performance as follows: 
H2: A gender diverse board has a negative effect on firm market valuation. 
H3: A gender diverse board has a negative effect on firm performance. 
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4. Sample construction and data description 
4.1. Sample construction 
The sample consists of a panel of firm characteristics and board members in publically listed 
Swedish firms from 2006-2011. We start with director level data such as age, gender, 
independence and position, which we aggregate to firm level.1 Thomson Reuters DataStream 
has been used to collect financial data for each firm, where some data was needed to estimate 
Tobin’s q and return on assets. Since data was not available for all firms, our sample varies 
from 233 to 238 firms.  
 
4.2. Variable definition 
Our main explanatory variable of interest, the fraction of females on the board, excludes 
employee representatives. Employee representatives are one of the characteristics of Swedish 
boards, and by excluding these directors we get a more accurate picture of females in boards 
(Adams and Funk 2012). 
 
In order to control for other factors affecting CEO turnover and firm performance we control 
for common board and firm characteristics: 
CEO compensation and other incentives such as stock ownership are connected with board 
monitoring. Monitoring has been shown to have a negative relation to the fraction of CEO 
shares. The relation is to be due to the CEOs interests which are more aligned with the 
shareholders if shares are owned. This, in turn, may lead to a lower need for monitoring. 
(Brick et al. 2006). CEO age and the board’s average age are controlled for, in line with Coles 
et al. (2008). Natural CEO turnovers due to retirement will most likely result in a strong 
relationship between CEO turnover and CEO age, which is consistent with previous studies 
(Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Weisbach 1988). Boards that are older on average could be 
more conservative, and could therefore affect both monitoring and performance (Randøy et al. 
2006). The gender of the CEO is also included to control for CEO characteristics in the CEO 
turnover regressions (Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Data regarding directors collected from Boards of Directors and Auditors in Sweden’s Listed Companies, SIS 
Ägarservice. Data for ownership structure is collected from Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies, 
SIS Ägarservice while data on compensation and ownership is collected from corporate reports. Mentioned data 
is provided by Moursli Mohamed-Reda.!
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We control for board size, which is measured as the total number of board members. This 
follows previous studies that find an inverse relationship between board size and Tobin’s q. 
The size of the board also seems to have a connection with the likeliness of dismissing the 
CEO for poor performance (Coles et al. 2008); (Yermack 1996). 
 
We also control for independent directors and female independent directors in the board, 
following Liu et al. (2014). Studies have shown that outside independent directors appear to 
strengthen the corporate board in such a manner that it better fulfils their obligations to the 
shareholders by controlling and monitoring the CEO. To protect shareholders’ value, 
independent directors are not a solution in per se, but still an important element of the board 
(Petra 2005). Another study shows that the relation between past stock performance and CEO 
resignations are stronger in firms with higher degree of independent directors (Weisbach 
1988). 
 
We include a control for employee directors given that they often take sides with shareholders 
(Adams et al. 2011). We measure it as the fraction of employee directors. Employee directors 
could have different impacts on both monitoring and performance, according to Bøhren and 
Strøm (2010). They have also shown that firms with less employee representatives in the 
boardroom create less value. Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find that employee directors improve 
monitoring and reduces agency costs.  
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a significant negative relationship between CEO turnover and 
stock return. Their results indicate that the CEO is more likely to be replaced as the company 
exhibits poor stock performance. We control for the yearly stock return of the company, and 
also to examine the way gender diverse boards react to stock returns in their monitoring of the 
CEO. Following Goyal and Park (2002), we control for firm risk which we measure using the 
standard deviation of stock return. They argue that a high volatility in stock returns could 
indicate that the firm works in a more demanding setting, and that the board is less likely to 
dismiss a CEO due to bad stock performance in these cases. We control for firm size using the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s yearly net sales, following Adams and Ferreira (2009). Firm 
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size could have an impact on the management structure, i.e. how much responsibility and help 
the CEO has in running the firm, as well as firm performance (Palmon and Wald 2002).  
 
The three dependent variables are Tobin’s q, Return on Assets and CEO turnover. CEO 
turnover is used as a proxy for firm monitoring, where the replacement of a CEO could be the 
result of an active board of directors that put more effort into monitoring. We measure CEO 
turnover with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO was replaced the following year. 
In line with Adams and Ferreira (2009), the variable is defined to be missing in the last 
observed year for each individual firm. The two performance variables Tobin’s q and Return 
on assets are used to include both a market-based measure and an accounting measure. 
Tobin’s q is proxied by dividing equity market value plus liabilities market value by equity 
book value plus liabilities book value. At least 96% of the variability in Tobin’s q is indicated 
to be reflected in this approximation (Chung and Pruitt 1994). This estimation is also 
consistent with much of the related literature (Coles et al. 2008). Return on Assets is 
measured by the ratio of net income on total assets.  
 
4.3. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for the variables used in our regressions are provided in Table 1. The 
female representation on the board of directors is on average 16.9 percent, when employee 
directors are excluded. The total gender balance of the sample is depicted in Graph 1. It shows 
that in our sample, over the years 2006-2011, 20% are women.  Graph 2 shows the female 
representation in the board for each individual year. 2006 the female representation was 
17.5%. The female representation increases every year and reaches almost 23% in 2011. Out 
of 390 unique CEO individuals, our sample includes 11 female CEOs, a representation of 
approximately 2.8 percent. Graph 3 illustrates the fraction of female CEOs for each individual 
year in our sample. In 2007, not even 1% of the CEOs are women. The fraction of female 
CEOs reaches its maximum in 2011 with 3.6%. Out of 1294 observations 192 boards, or 
14.83 percent, have no female representation. 
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The average age for CEOs in our sample is roughly 50 years, while the board has a mean of 
54.36 years. Graph 4 shows the difference in male and female board member age for each 
individual year. Female board members have an average age about 50, while their male 
colleagues are on average 5 years older. The average board size is about 8 seats, but varies 
from 3 up to 15. 132 CEO turnovers have taken place during the time period of our sample. 
 
We report correlation coefficients in Table 5. While a high correlation is displayed between 
some variables, such as volatility and stock return, most other correlations seem to be small in 
size. This insinuates that our analysis is not affected by multicollinearity to a high extent. 
There is a significant correlation between the fraction of female independent directors and the 
fraction of females in the board. The correlation is higher than 0,7 which could indicate a 
problem of multicollinearity (Liu et al. 2014). 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1. Gender diversity and monitoring 
To study the effects of a gender diverse board on monitoring, we construct an econometric 
model as specified below: 
 !"# = %"# + '()*+,*-"# + ./"# + .0"# + 1 + 2" + 3"# 
 
In this model, Y denotes our dependent variable CEO turnover, with the subscripts i for the 
specific firm and t for the time period (year). Gender is our main explanatory variable, the 
fraction of female directors in the board. X denotes a vector of board controls and γ is a vector 
for the coefficient of each individual variable. The board control variables included are CEO 
age, CEO gender, CEO shareholdings and CEO compensation. We also control for the 
average age in the board, board size, the fraction of independent directors and the fraction of 
employee directors.  Z is a vector for firm controls and γ is again the vector for the coefficient 
of each control variable. The variables we control for are Stock return, Volatility and the 
logarithm of Net Sales.  
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The time variable t is included as year dummies in the regressions, and is included to adjust 
for trends in the data (Roberts and Whited 2012; Adams and Ferreira 2009). Graph 2 gives an 
indication that trends could be present in our data. Year dummies for the first and last years of 
our sample 2006 and 2011 are omitted from our regressions to avoid perfect collinearity. The 
letter θ denotes the firm specific unobservable factors that are constant over time. We 
elaborate on these fixed effects below. U denotes the remaining error term that varies over 
time in our estimated model. 
 
Endogeneity, when the independent variables are correlated with the error term in a 
regression, is one of the most important problems facing a researcher when doing a study in 
finance. Since endogeneity leads to biased results, it’s important to be aware of its 
consequences when doing empirical research. (Roberts and Whited 2012). When studying the 
impact of gender diversity on governance and performance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) point 
out that firm characteristics, that are impossible to observe and therefore left out of a 
regression, can lead to problems with endogeneity. If there are correlations between gender 
diversity and variables describing governance, the regression results can be misleading. Some 
firms might have a developed culture, resulting in the company having both a gender diverse 
board and a well-structured governance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) handle these problems by 
assuming that firm specific culture and other omitted factors don’t vary across the time period 
of their sample, and therefore use a fixed effects regression to avoid biased estimators.  
 
Following Adams and Ferreira (2009) we study our model above using both Pooled OLS and 
fixed effects regressions. The fixed effects regressions are done after a Hausman test assured 
us that our effects were unique for each firm, and random effects estimation should not be 
used. Fixed effects estimation allow us to handle problems due to time-invariant firm 
characteristics and reduce the severity of problems caused by variable bias (Roberts and 
Withed 2012). 
 
When using fixed effects, Roberts and Withed (2012) stress that endogeneity can never be 
completely solved by the method and also discuss that other econometric problems can arise. 
Measurement problems could be a concern and when using lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables in a regression the coefficients can be misleading (Roberts and Withed 
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2012). In some of our regressions, we include one year lagged performance measures to 
control for present performance being affected by past performance as is commonly done 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009; Bøhren and Strøm).  
 
Robust standard errors are used in all of our regressions. This is to avoid the problems of 
heteroscedasticity that can cause biased results (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Before using 
robust standard errors, we conduct the necessary Breusch Pagan test to ensure we have 
heteroscedasticity in our model. 
 
5.2. Gender diversity and firm performance 
We specify a second model constructed in the same way as in section 5.1, now with a set of 
different variables, to study gender diversity and firm performance. !"# = %"# + '()*+,*-"# + ./"# + .0"# + 1 + 2" + 3"# 
The definitions for the model is similar to the one in 5.1, however, in the model above, Y 
denotes the dependent variables in our regressions, Tobin’s q and ROA.  
Gender is our main explanatory variable of interest, the fraction of female directors in the 
board. X is a vector of board controls, and the control variables used in this model are the 
fraction of independent female directors and the fraction of independent directors as well as 
employee directors. The average age in the board and board size are also controlled for. Z 
denotes a vector of firm controls, and we control for Volatility, the logarithm of Net Sales and 
a one year lag of our dependent performance variables.  
 
A problem when studying the effects of gender diversity on firm performance discussed by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) is the matter of reverse causality. The authors pose that firm 
performance can cause women to want to join the firm, as well as a higher level of 
recruitment from the firm itself. Adams and Ferreira (2009) solve this problem by using an 
instrumental variable for the fraction of women on the board. They argue that male directors 
who sit on other boards (across their sample) with female directors is a valid instrument, as it 
is correlated to the fraction of females on the board but should be uncorrelated with firm 
performance. The theory behind their instrument is that a lack of connections is often cited as 
why women are a minority in the boardroom, and when the male directors are more connected 
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to females the more female board members should be observed. The authors conclude that the 
need of an instrumental variable approach is great in this research subject, as gender diversity 
is endogenous and complex in nature. 
 
To try to solve the problems with reverse causality and endogeneity, we construct an 
instrumental variable similar to the one used by Adams and Ferreira (2009). We use a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if a board member is male and sits in multiple boards, in which at 
least one board has female board members. We then sum this variable and divide it by board 
size to get the fraction of male board members (for each firm and year) who sit in multiple 
corporate boards with female directors. On average 26.4 percent of board members in our 
sample are male that sit on multiple boards with female directors. 209 out of 1294 
observations contain no male directors that sit on multiple boards with females, corresponding 
to 16.15 percent of our observations.  
 
This instrument is significantly correlated with the fraction of female directors in the board, as 
is shown in the first stage regressions presented in our results-section. This significant 
correlation implies that our instrument meets the validity requirements of an instrumental 
variable (Roberts and Withed 2012). To be a proper instrument, the variable would also have 
to be exogenous. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that their instrument is uncorrelated with 
their measures of firm performance, due to controlling for other observable factors. The 
authors’ stress that the independent directors of the board is an important control to achieve 
exogeneity using this instrumental approach, as the instrument could be a proxy for how 
connected the board is, which could be correlated with firm performance. Following this 
discussion by the authors we control for independent directors. They also discuss that fixed 
effects could remove problems of the instrumental variable being correlated with the 
dependent variable. However, in this thesis, we are only able to use our instrumental variable 
in Pooled OLS regressions. When using fixed effects, the instrument loses its significant first 
stage correlation with the fraction of female directors, and therefore the validity requirement 
is not met for fixed effects estimation.  Despite not being able to use our instrument with fixed 
effects, we could avoid reverse causality problems that our ordinary Pooled OLS regressions 
could contain (Roberts and Withed 2012).   
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The problem of outliers is another econometric problem frequently discussed, and can cause 
unreliable test estimates in regressions (Gassner et al. 2008). In our sample, we observe that 
the data on Tobin’s q may contain extreme values, since the maximum observed value is 
much higher than four standard deviations from the mean. To avoid problems with these 
possible outliers affecting our regression estimates, we winsorize Tobin’s q at 1%. This 
method is frequently used to handle the problems of outliers causing biased estimators (Ghosh 
and Vogt 2012).  The results for both winsorized and regular Tobin’s q are presented in the 
Results-section. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Gender and monitoring 
The results from four regressions with CEO turnover as the dependent variable is presented in 
Table 2. The number of observations is 983 for every regression, and this number can be 
explained by the construction of our dependent variable as well as lacking firm data for a few 
companies in our sample. 
 
In column 1, we present the results from a Pooled OLS regression. The coefficient for the 
fraction of females in the board is insignificant, but we find significant results for Stock 
return, CEO age, the average age in the board, Volatility and CEO shareholding. We interact 
stock return with the fraction of females in the board in column 2 and find no significant 
effect on the coefficient of the interaction variable. 
 
 
Column 3 presents results from a fixed effects regression. It shows that the fraction of female 
directors in the board has a negative effect on CEO turnover, significant at the 5% level. This 
effect indicates that a more gender diverse board leads to lower CEO turnover in the firm, in 
contrast to previous research by Adams and Ferreira (2009). The effect of stock return is 
significant at the 5% level, and the negative sign is as expected, and implies that a decrease in 
returns leads to an increase in CEO turnover (Adams and Ferreira 2009).  
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In column 4, we interact the fraction of female directors with stock return in a fixed effects 
regression. On the contrary to Adams and Ferreira (2009) this interaction variable does not 
have a significant effect on CEO turnover. However, the fraction of female directors still has 
a significant negative effect on our dependent variable, but the effect of stock return is now 
insignificant. The interaction has the expected negative sign, which suggests, if it was 
significant, that CEO turnover decreases as returns increase in a gender diverse board (Adams 
and Ferreira 2009).  Since our interaction variable is insignificant, we reject our hypothesis 
that a gender diverse board is more likely to replace the CEO for bad stock performance.   
 
We also find another result regarding gender diversity, the effect of CEO gender is significant 
at the 1% level, and the positive effect suggests that CEO turnover is more likely if the CEO 
is female. This result, however interesting, should not be interpreted as a causal effect due to 
the low number of female CEOs observed in our sample (Roberts and Whited 2012).  
 
Like Adams and Ferreira (2009) our result implies that there is a significant relationship 
between the gender diversity of the board and CEO turnover. In contrast to previous research, 
our findings suggest that gender diverse boards are not tougher in their monitoring of the 
CEO.  
 
 
6.2. Gender and firm performance 
In this section we present results from regression using our second model specified in 5.2, 
regarding the effects of gender diversity on firm performance. The results found from six 
regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable are presented in Table 3. The number of 
observations vary between 1018 and 975, due to winsorizing Tobin’s q. The use of lags also 
makes us lose some observations, causing the difference from the number of observations 
presented in the Summary statistics section. 
 
In column 1, we use Pooled OLS, and find no significant effect on the fraction of female 
directors on Tobin’s q. In column 2 we use Pooled OLS again, after winsorizing Tobin’s q at 
the 1% level. The coefficient for our main explanatory variable show no significant effect.   
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In column 3, we use the fraction of males who have board connections with women as an 
instrument for the fraction of female directors. The top row in the column displays that the 
instrument is negatively correlated with our main explanatory variable at the 1% level, after 
controlling for other factors. However, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a significant positive 
correlation between the fraction of women board members and our instrumental variable. Our 
results could be due to the mentality of female board directors in Sweden. Adams and Funk 
(2012) prove that female directors in Sweden care less about conformity and could therefore 
be less connected to male colleagues, who often are a majority.  
 
Column 4 displays the second stage results, and presents that the two-stage least squares 
coefficient for the fraction of females in board is not significant after using our instrumental 
variable.  
 
Column 5 and 6 presents results from fixed effects regressions. In column 5, we find no 
significant effect of gender diversity on Tobin’s q. The sixth column shows the results after 
winsorizing Tobin’s q at the 1% level, and the coefficient for our main explanatory variable is 
not significant.  
 
Even though we find no significant relationship between Tobin’s q and gender diversity, the 
coefficients are positive, and not negative that we hypothesized. This is in line with the results 
by Rose (2007) who also finds insignificant, but positive coefficients. Our results could also 
be due to having low variation in the fraction of females in the board, which combined with 
fixed effects could result in insignificant findings (Roberts and Withed 2012). With our 
insignificant results in mind, we reject our hypothesis of a gender diverse board having a 
negative impact on firm market valuation, measured by Tobin’s q. 
 
 
 
 
The results from four regression with Return on Assets as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 4. The 977 observations are lower than the observations presented in 
section 4, due to the use of lagged ROA as a dependent variable .In column 1, we find no 
significant effect of the fraction of female directors on ROA in our Pooled OLS regression.  
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These results are further reinforced in column 2 and 3, where we present the results for our 
instrumental variable. Column 2 shows the significant correlation between the instrument and 
the fraction of females in the board, as previously reported. In column 3, we find no 
significant results for our two-stage least squares coefficient using an instrumental variable. 
 
 
In column 4, we use a fixed effects regression, and find a positive significant effect of the 
fraction of females in board on ROA. This effect is significant at the 10% level. Our results in 
column 4 suggests that gender diverse boards are correlated with higher firm performance. 
Although, our results could also be due to possible collinearity problems within the model. In 
their Chinese sample, Liu et al (2014) also find a significant positive relationship between 
gender diversity and ROA, and the authors provide several explanations. They discuss that 
gender diverse boards offer improved communication and improve the previous weak 
governance in Chinese firms. With this significant positive effect in mind, combined with the 
previous insignificant results, we reject our hypothesis of a gender diverse board having a 
negative effect on firm performance, measured by Return on Assets.  
 
 
The majority of our results from gender diversity and firm performance and firm market 
valuation are insignificant, and are in line with the results of Rose (2007) and Randøy et al. 
(2006). Rose (2007) finds no connection between the female representation in boards and 
Tobin’s q, and argues that females, who are a minority in the boardroom, could be forced to 
adapt to the mindset of the male majority and an eventual gender influence is lost. Therefore, 
the effects of board gender diversity can’t be measured by firm performance (Rose 2007).  
 
 
Randøy et al. (2006) find no significant effect of gender diversity on ROA with Pooled OLS 
regressions, and argue that it’s hard to distinguish the effect of gender diversity on firm 
performance, since there are a lot of other factors that can affect the performance of a 
company. Like our regression results from fixed effects, Randøy et al. (2006) have a positive 
sign on their coefficients for ROA.  
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Instead of gender diversity, firm performance and firm market valuation overall seems to be 
affected by past performance, as we get highly significant effects from our one year lags of 
both Tobin’s q and ROA. These significant effects are similar to many other studies, for 
example Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Bøhren and Strøm (2010).  For Return on Assets, the 
coefficient for the logarithm of Net Sales is significant for both Pooled OLS and fixed effects 
regressions. This result suggests that firm size has a positive effect on firm performance and is 
in line with the results by Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, we contribute to the literature studying the effects of gender diversity on board 
and firm outcomes.  In our sample of Swedish publically listed companies, we find a 
significant relationship between gender diversity and CEO turnover, which suggests that 
gender diverse boards are related to less CEO turnover. We also study the effects of gender 
diversity on firm performance and firm market valuation, and find that there is no significant 
connection with firm market valuation, and a positive significant relationship with firm 
performance.  
 
In studies examining the effects of diversity, a common problem is establishing a causal 
effect, due to endogeneity and reverse causality. The influence of gender diversity is hard to 
separate from other individual characteristics that are omitted from the analysis (Ferreira 
2015). In our study, we use fixed effects and instrumental variable methods to try to prevent 
our results from being biased. However, there are still unobserved factors that we are not able 
to take into account, that often cause endogeneity problems in similar studies. Examples of 
unobservable factors are CEO and director ability (Roberts and Whited 2012) or the social 
network between directors (Ferreira 2015). Finding solutions for these problems could be 
important tasks for future research. 
 
Since we find no significant effect of gender diversity on firm market valuation, and a 
positive significant effect on firm performance, this thesis does not give negative business 
motives for policy action regarding gender equality in boardrooms. Despite finding 
insignificant results for firm market valuation, equality in Swedish boardrooms could be 
beneficial in a broader scope. A quote by Ferreira (2015) puts the discussion into perspective: 
“I do not think that the lack of evidence that female board representation improves 
profitability is a problem. The business case is a bad idea anyway. When discussing 
policies that promote women in business, it is better to focus on potential benefits to 
society that go far beyond narrow measures of firm profitability” 
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Graphs and tables 
 
Graph 1: The total gender balance in the boardrooms of the firms in our sample 
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Graph 2: Female representation trend  
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Graph 3: Female CEO representation trend 
 
 
 
Graph 4: Differences in average age between genders 
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Table description: Fraction females in board is the number of female directors in the board divided 
by the board size, less employee representatives. CEO turnover is a dummy variable that is one if the 
CEO is replaces in the following year. CEO gender is a dummy variable that is one if the CEO is a 
woman. CEO age is the age of the CEO. Average age in board is the sum of the board member’s age 
divided by board size. CEO compensation is the compensation for the CEO, presented in thousands. 
CEO shareholding is the number of A-shares and B-shares held by the CEO. Fraction independent 
female directors is the fraction of female independent directors in the board, while Fraction 
independent directors include both men and women. Fraction employee directors is the fraction of 
employee directors in the board. Stock return is calculated on a yearly basis while volatility is the 
standard deviation of the stock return. ROA is the ration of a firm’s net income to its book value of 
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Net sales is the yearly 
net sales, presented in thousands. 
Table 1      
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Fraction females in board 1294 0.169 0.104 0 0.571 
CEO turnover 1038 0.127 0.333 0 1 
CEO gender 1294 0.019 0.135 0 1 
CEO age 1294 50.065 7.015 32 67 
Average age in board 1294 54.364 3.851 40 65.500 
Board size 1294 7.974 2.144 3 15 
CEO compensation 1294 4563.415 4816.657 0 28500 
CEO shareholding 
 
Fraction independent 
female directors 
1294 
 
1294 
0.234 
 
0.123 
0.309 
 
0.112 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
0.5 
Fraction independent    
directors 
1294 0.430 0.243 0 0.889 
Fraction employee 
directors 
1294 0.091 0.113 0 0.333 
Stock return 1253 0.002 0.047 -0.173 0.187 
Volatility 1250 0.109 0.056 0.024 0.587 
ROA 1247 0.021 0.194 -2.295 0.764 
Tobin’s q 1251 1.895 1.936 0.433 27.954 
Net sales 1246 12299.205 33211.450 -34172 310367 
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Table 2 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CEO turnover 
(Pooled OLS) 
CEO turnover 
(Pooled OLS) 
CEO turnover 
(Fixed Effects) 
CEO turnover 
(Fixed Effects) 
     
Fraction females -0.048 -0.045 -0.418** -0.413** 
 (0.104) (0.108) (0.203) (0.202) 
Stock return -1.426*** -1.347** -0.897** -0.838 
 (0.356) (0.545) (0.393) (0.562) 
Fraction females in board 
times Stock return 
 -0.478  -0.339 
  (2.344)  (1.947) 
CEO age 0.004** 0.004** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Board size 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
CEO gender -0.011 -0.011 0.507*** 0.505*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.132) (0.131) 
Log (Net Sales) -0.004 -0.003 0.033 0.033 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.033) (0.033) 
Average age in board -0.006* -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Fraction independent 0.021 0.020 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.078) (0.079) 
Fraction employee -0.041 -0.042 -0.555 -0.555 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.389) (0.389) 
CEO compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO shareholdings -0.058* -0.058* -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.131) (0.131) 
Volatility 0.439** 0.442** 0.057 0.059 
 (0.204) (0.205) (0.311) (0.313) 
2007 -0.020 -0.019 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
2008 -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.087* -0.087* 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) 
2009 -0.051 -0.051 -0.041 -0.041 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
2010 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.017 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant 0.242 0.241 -0.958 -0.962 
 (0.177) (0.176) (0.693) (0.692) 
     
Observations 983 983 983 983 
R-squared 0.044 0.045 0.075 0.075 
Number of firms   235 235 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Pooled OLS  OLS Winsor  First stage OLS IV 
Second stage 
OLS IV  Fixed effect  
Fixed effect 
Winsor 
Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q 
 Fraction 
female in 
board 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q Tobin's q 
      !!     
Fraction males 
connected to females 
(IV)   
-0.040***   !!
!   (0.012)    Fraction females in 
board 0.928 0.572  4.272 1.838 0.843 
 (1.279) (0.449)  (5.753) (1.812) (0.820) 
Fraction independent 
females -0.384 -0.140 0.820*** -3.121 -1.070 -0.113 
 (1.117) (0.455) (0.023) (4.732) (1.790) (0.744) Volatility 2.495* 1.398 -0.012 2.507*** 2.383 1.409 
 (1.338) (0.987) (0.040) (0.808) (1.594) (1.037) 
Log(Net Sales) -0.045 -0.020 0.004*** -0.054* -0.101 -0.052 
 (0.045) (0.026) (0.001) (0.030) (0.459) (0.318) 
Fraction independent 0.045 0.181 -0.124*** 0.442 -0.472 -0.125 
 (0.245) (0.195) (0.012) (0.726) (0.368) (0.229) 
Fraction employee  -0.021 -0.059 -0.151*** 0.419 0.860 1.006 
 (0.410) (0.328) (0.026) (0.920) (0.689) (0.672) 
Average age in board 0.005 0.001 0.002*** 0.014 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) 2007 0.258** 0.116 -0.005 0.273* 0.421*** 0.353*** 
 (0.130) (0.081) (0.007) (0.142) (0.107) (0.096) 2008 0.398*** 0.336*** -0.005 0.383*** -0.418** 0.303*** 
 (0.152) (0.086) (0.007) (0.143) (0.175) (0.082) 2009 0.586*** 0.614*** -0.012* 0.628*** 0.280** 0.330*** 
 (0.137) (0.102) (0.007) (0.156) (0.127) (0.107) 2010 0.477*** 0.395*** -0.005 0.495*** 0.402*** 0.352*** 
 (0.120) (0.076) (0.007) (0.135) (0.109) (0.071) 
Board size 0.020 0.018 0.005*** 0.004 -0.040 -0.033 
 (0.040) (0.024) (0.001) (0.039) (0.069) (0.051) 
Lag Tobin’s q 0.608*** 0.705*** 0.000 0.606*** 0.145*** 0.197*** 
 (0.121) (0.046) (0.001) (0.021) (0.054) (0.074) 
       Constant 0.199 -0.006 0.184*** -0.464 3.516 2.507 
 (0.775) (0.440) (0.035) (1.336) (5.799) (4.289) 
       Observations 1,018 975 1,018 1,018 1,018 975 
R-squared 0.511 0.665 0.628 0.497 0.105 0.166 
              
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS First stage OLS 
Second stage 
OLS Fixed effects 
VARIABLES ROA Fraction females in board ROA ROA 
Fraction males connected 
to females (IV)  -0.045***   
  (0.012)   
Fraction females in board -0.010  1.104 0.222* 
 (0.074)  (1.017) (0.129) 
Fraction independent 
females -0.062 0.830*** -0.985 -0.153 
 (0.096) (0.021) (0.849) (0.121) 
Volatility -0.438** -0.026 -0.420** -0.162 
 (0.200) (0.037) (0.197) (0.214) 
Log(Net Sales) 0.024*** 0.004*** 0.021*** 0.130** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.064) 
Fraction independent  -0.018 -0.124*** 0.113 -0.046 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.121) (0.051) 
Fraction employee -0.035 -0.143*** 0.100 0.020 
 (0.056) (0.024) (0.158) (0.238) 
Average age in board -0.001 -0.002*** 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Board size -0.009** 0.004*** -0.014* 0.018 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) 
Lag ROA 0.380*** 0.004 0.376*** -0.192*** 
 (0.074) (0.013) (0.073) (0.043) 
2007 0.015 -0.003 0.018 0.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.019) 2008 -0.018 0.001 -0.020 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.023) (0.022) 2009 0.016 -0.009 0.026 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.022) 2010 0.012 -0.003 0.015 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) 
Constant -0.151 0.185*** -0.375 -1.967** 
 (0.098) (0.035) (0.229) (0.941) 
     Observations 977 977 977 977 
R-squared 0.258 0.654 0.130 0.158 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                 
                 
Table 5 Fraction 
females 
in board 
CEO 
turnover 
CEO 
gender 
CEO age Average 
age in 
board 
Board size CEO 
compensati
on 
CEO 
shareholdin
g 
Fraction 
independen
t female 
directors 
Fraction 
independen
t directors 
Fraction 
employee 
directors 
Stock 
return 
Volatility ROA Tobi
n’s q 
Net 
sal
es 
Fraction females 
in board 
1                
                 
CEO turnover 0.00248 1               
                 
CEO gender 0.145*** 0.00551 1              
                 
CEO age 0.0577* 0.0436 -0.0585* 1             
                 
Average age in 
board 
0.0831** -0.0435 -0.0555* 0.444*** 1            
                 
Board size 0.111*** 0.0261 0.0497 0.134*** 0.0861** 1           
                 
CEO 
compensation 
0.133*** -0.00893 0.00424 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.539*** 1          
                 
CEO 
shareholding 
-0.0282 -0.0694* -0.0832** 0.241*** 0.135*** -0.101*** 0.0590* 1         
                 
Fraction 
independent 
female directors 
0.728*** -0.0253 -0.0553* 0.0974*** 0.0157 0.0950*** 0.158*** 0.0859** 1        
                 
Fraction 
independent 
directors 
0.292*** -0.0199 -0.0211 0.0692* 0.0717** -0.0345 0.0827** 0.160*** 0.628*** 1       
                 
Fraction 
employee 
directors 
-0.0408 0.0180 0.0277 0.147*** 0.0529 0.681*** 0.305*** -0.00229 -0.0330 -0.184*** 1      
                 
Stock return 0.0289 -0.126*** -0.0240 0.0158 0.0179 -0.00690 0.0367 -0.00596 0.0866** 0.115*** -0.0290 1     
                 
Volatility -0.0496 -0.00122 0.0193 0.0169 -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.134*** 0.0160 -0.0228 0.0203 0.00430 0.208*** 1    
                 
ROA 0.0356 -0.0489 -0.0123 -0.0260 0.0108 0.0754** 0.125*** 0.0243 -0.00284 -0.0348 0.0377 0.176*** -0.249*** 1   
                 
Tobin’s q 0.0357 -0.00786 -0.0566* -0.0537 -0.0672* -0.108*** -0.0125 -0.0294 0.00555 -0.0281 -0.0791** 0.243*** 0.147*** -0.0227 1  
                 
Net sales 0.0372 -0.0218 0.0461 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.495*** 0.504*** 0.0886** 0.0653* -0.0238 0.337*** -0.00392 -0.0889** 0.0695* 0.04 1 
                 
N 1294                
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Dependent: Included as dependent variables in regressions. 
CEO turnover A dummy variable that shows if the current CEO was replaced the 
following year. Defined to be missing in the last year of our sample. 
Tobin’s q Estimated by the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value of 
assets. 
ROA Return on Assets is the ratio of a firm’s net income to its book value of 
assets. 
Explanatory: Included as explanatory variables in regressions. 
Fraction females in 
board 
The fraction of female directors in the board, less employee 
representatives. 
Board size The sum of all board members. 
Average board age The sum of all board member’s age divided by the board size. 
Fraction employee 
directors 
The fraction of employee directors in the board. 
Fraction independent The fraction of independent directors in the board. 
Fraction independent 
female directors 
The fraction of independent female directors in the board 
CEO age The age of the CEO. 
CEO gender A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is female. 
CEO compensation The yearly compensation for the CEO. 
CEO shareholdings The number of CEO-owned shares, divided by the total number of 
shares held by the board. 
Net sales  Yearly net sales for each individual firm. 
Stock return Stock return calculated on yearly basis. 
Volatility The standard deviation of the stock return. 
35 
Appendix 2 
 
A-Com 
AcadeMedia 
Acando 
ACAP Invest 
Active Biotech 
Addnode Group 
Addtech 
Aerocrine 
aF 
Affarsstratgerna 
Alfa Laval 
AllTele 
Anoto Group 
Arcam 
Arise Windpower 
Artimplant 
Aspiro 
Assa Abloy 
Atlas Copco 
Atrium Ljungberg 
AudioDev 
Avanza Bank Holding 
Avega Group 
Axfood 
Axis 
B&B Tools 
Balder 
Ballingslov 
BE Group 
Beijer Alma 
Beijer Electronics 
Bergs Timber 
Betsson 
Bilia 
BillerudKorsnas 
BioGaia 
BioInvent International 
BioPhausia 
Biotage 
Bjorn Borg 
Boliden 
Bong 
Boras Wafveri 
Brinova 
Brio 
Brostrom 
BTS Group 
Bure Equity 
Byggmax Group 
Cardo 
CashGuard 
Castellum 
Catena 
CDON Group 
CellaVision 
Cision 
Clas Ohlson 
Cloetta 
Concordia Maritime 
Connecta 
Consilium 
Corem Property Group 
CTT Systems 
Cybercom Group 
D.Carnegie & Co 
Dagon 
Dedicare 
DGC One 
Dios Fastigheter 
Doro 
Duni 
Duroc 
East Capital Explorer 
Elanders 
Electra Gruppen 
Electrolux 
Elekta 
ElektronikGruppen BK 
Elos 
Enea 
Eniro 
Ericsson 
eWork Scandinavia 
Fabege 
Fagerhult 
Fast Partner 
Feelgood 
Fenix Outdoor 
Fingerprint Cards 
FormPipe Software 
G & L Beijer 
Getinge 
Geveko 
Global Health Partner 
Gunnebo 
Haldex 
Havsfrun 
Heba 
Hemtex 
Hennes & Mauritz 
Hexagon 
Hexpol 
HiQ International 
HMS Networks 
Hoganas 
Holmen 
HQ 
Hufvudstaden 
Human Care 
Husqvarna 
IAR Systems Group 
IBS 
IFS 
Image Systems 
Industrivarden 
Indutrade 
Intellecta 
Intrum Justitia 
Investor 
ITAB Shop Concept 
Jeeves 
JM 
Kabe 
KappAhl 
Karo Bio 
Karolinska Development 
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Kinnevik 
Klovern 
Know IT 
Kungsleden 
Lagercrantz Group 
Lammhults Design Group 
Latour 
Ledstiernan 
Lindab International 
Loomis 
Lundbergs 
Lundin Petroleum 
Malmbergs Elektriska 
Meda 
Medivir 
Mekonomen 
Melker Schorling 
Micro Systemation 
Micronic Mydata/Micronic Systems 
Midsona 
Midway Holding 
Moberg Pharma/Derma 
Modul 1 
MQ Holding 
MSC 
MTG 
MultiQ International 
Munters 
NAXS Nordic Access Buyout Fund 
NCC 
Nederman Holding 
Neonet 
Net Entertainment 
Net Insight 
NetOnNet 
New Wave Group 
Nexus 
Nibe Industrier 
Nilorngruppen 
Nobia 
Nolato 
Nordea Bank 
Nordic Mines 
Nordic Service Partners Holding 
Nordnet 
NOTE 
Novestra 
Novotek 
Oasmia Pharmaceutical 
Odd Molly International 
OEM International 
Opcon 
Orc Group/Orc Software 
Orexo 
Ortivus 
PA Resources 
PartnerTech 
Peab 
Poolia 
Precise Biometrics 
Prevas 
Pricer 
Proact IT Group 
Probi 
Proffice 
ProfilGruppen 
Q-Med 
Ratos 
RaySearch Laboratories 
ReadSoft 
Rederi AB TransAtlantic 
Rejlerkoncernen 
Rezidor Hotel Group 
RNB Retail and Brands 
Rorvik Timber 
Rottneros 
Saab 
Sagax 
SakI 
Sandvik 
SAS 
SCA 
Scania 
Scribona 
SEB 
Seco Tools 
Sectra 
Securitas 
Semcon 
Sensys Traffic 
SHB 
Sigma 
SinterCast 
Skanditek 
Skanska 
SKF 
SkiStar 
Softronic 
SSAB 
Studsvik 
Svedbergs 
Svolder 
Sweco 
Swedbank 
Swedish Match 
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum 
Swedol 
Systemair 
Tele2 
Teleca 
TeliaSonera 
Teligent 
Thalamus Networks 
Ticket Travel Group 
Traction 
TradeDoubler 
Transmode Holding 
Trelleborg 
Tricorona 
Uniflex 
VBG Group 
Venue Retail Group 
Vitrolife 
Volvo 
Wallenstam 
Wihlborgs 
XANO Industri 
Zodiak Television  
Øresund 
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